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I. INTRODUCTION
The 1980's and 1990's have been characterized by increased
levels of merger, acquisition, and takeover activity.' While this trend
has affected many sectors of the economy, it has been especially
pronounced in the banking and finance industry.2  Merger and
acquisition are often sound strategies for addressing the primary goals
of banks: growth into new geographic markets, development of new
product areas, and response to threats from business competitors.3 As
growth has become more crucial to survival, the incidence of mergers
and takeovers in the banking arena has increased. 4 The fact that over
two-fifths of the industry's participants have been acquired since
World War II underscores the effect that this trend has had on the
industry.5
The acquisition of small and medium-sized community banks
6
1.See Devra L. Golbe & Lawrence J. White, Mergers and Acquisitions in U.S.
Economy: An Aggregate and Historical Overview, in MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 25
(Alan J. Auerbach, ed., 1988) (stating that there have been other periods of high activity,
including the late 1960's); Steven Lipin, Murphy's Law Doesn't Apply: The Conditions
are Perfect for Continued Growth in Mergers, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 1998, at R6 (stating
that this trend was especially pronounced in the mid 1990's).
2. See HAZEL J. JOHNSON, BANK MERGERS & STRATEGIC ALLIANCES: POSITIONING
AND PROTECTING YOUR BANK IN THE ERA OF CONSOLIDATION 3 (1995). One example of
this trend is Charlotte based First Union, which averaged an acquisition about every 10
weeks from 1985 through 1995. See Lisa Davis, You Get What You Need, Bus. N.C.,
Jan. 1996, at 19.
3. See JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 4-7.
4. See id. at 4. The number of banks in the United States decreased by roughly one-
third from the mid-1970's to the-mid 1990's. See id. at 1-2. Over this same period, the
number of bank mergers per year has increased from around 100 to over 500 per annum,
peaking at around 800 in 1988. See id. at 3.
5. See Peter S. Rose, Profiles of U.S. Merging Banks and the Performance
Outcomes and Motivations for Recent Mergers, in BANK MERGERS: CURRENT ISSUES AND
PERSPECTIvES 3, 3-6 (1989).
6. "Community Banks" are small or medium sized institutions tailored to serve a
specific community. See Julie L. Williams, Remarks by Julie L. Williams Acting
Comptroller of the Currency before the McLean Chamber of Commerce (Oct. 28, 1998)
(visited Nov. 3, 1998) <http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/98-110.txt> [hereinafter
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
has proven to be an excellent means of increasing deposits, branch
infrastructure, and general market share.7 In this type of environment,
unsolicited bids for the acquisition of community banks are not
unusual.8 The options and duties of the directors of a community bank
in responding to an unwanted overture is an issue which, if it has not
already been a topic before a community bank's board of directors, is
likely to arise in the future.
The primary source of a director's responsibility springs from
the common law,9 though duties of directors have been codified in
most states."0 The boundaries of a director's duty are defined by the
duties of care" and loyalty."2  The board owes these duties to the
corporation and derivatively to the shareholders.' 3 While the duties of
care and loyalty are crucial in defining most facets of a director's
obligations, they are especially important in the realm of mergers and
acquisitions. 4
Williams Remarks]. What these banks lack in size is made up for in "nimbleness,
adaptability, knowledge of local markets, low overhead, and personal service." Id. Such
banks play a "vital role in the financial services industry" and are a key lending source
for smaller borrowers. See id.
7. See JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 80. See generally C. C. CAMERON, FIRST UNION
CORPORATION, BANK HOLDING COMPANY: A TRADITION OF LEADERSHIP 16-35 (1980);
HOWARD E. COVINGTON, JR. & MARION ELLIS, THE STORY OF NATIONSBANK (1993).
8. See generally CAMERON, supra note 7; COVINGTON & ELLIS, supra note 7;
JOHNSON, supra note 2.
9. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 179-82
(Del. 1986) (holding that the ultimate responsibility for managing a corporation falls on
the directors); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (holding that
directors owed an "unyielding fiduciary duty" to the corporation requiring prudence and
due care); Singer v. Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969, 976-77 (Del. 1977) (holding that the
directors and management of Magnavox owed the corporation a fiduciary duty during a
merger); Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 2 A.2d 225 (Del Ch. 1938), aff'd, 5 A.2d 503 (1939)
(holding that the president of a corporation owes that corporation a fiduciary duty, and is
prohibited from diverting corporate assets or opportunities for personal use); Wilson v.
McClenny, 136 S.E.2d 569 (N.C. 1964) (promoters of an as yet unformed corporation
owe it the same fiduciary duty as a properly formed corporation).
10. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1991) (describing duties of corporate
directors); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-30(a) (1997 Supp.) (describing the fashion in which
directors should discharge their duties).
11. See infra notes 42-92 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 42-92 and accompanying text.
13. See JAMES D. COX, CORPORATIONS § 10.1 (1997). Generally, the directors' duties
amount to a requirement that they serve in "good faith," exercise the care a reasonable,
prudent person in a similar situation would exercise, and refrain from competing with or
taking advantage of the bank. See id. See also RUSSELL M. ROBINSON, III, ROBINSON ON
NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION LAW §14-1 (5th ed. 1995).
14. See Cox, supra note 13, § 23.1; ROBINSON, supra note 13, §14-1.
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A board of directors faced with an unwanted bid for
acquisition may have additional considerations over and above those
relating to shareholders. 15 It is possible that a board of directors could
consider a deal's potential for causing a decline in overall service or
commitment to the community. Though this "duty to the community"
is probably subordinate to the directors' duty to the shareholders, 16
many community banks have nevertheless established close ties with
their surrounding communities or have adopted strong supporting roles
in their broader communities.' 7  Whether, and under what
circumstances, a board of directors may consider broader
constituency, or stakeholder, interests during bids for acquisition is
somewhat unsettled. 18
The assertion that consideration of broader constituencies rises
to the level of an affirmative duty could conceivably be supported in
three ways. First, the "duty to the community" approaches the level
of an affirmative duty when it has been drafted into the bank's charter
or into provisions of the bylaws that are approved by shareholders. 9
Second, federal legislation, such as the Community Reinvestment Act
(CRA), requires community involvement and has made a bank's
involvement in the immediate community (primarily involvement
through lending activity) an important factor affecting several facets of
the bank's operations, including mergers and acquisitions. 20 Finally, a
history of service to the community may define a bank's "corporate
culture," raising a theoretical argument of community reliance. "'
This article will first present a general review of the options
and duties of a board faced with an unwanted bid for acquisition .2 2 It
15. See infra notes 93-127 and accompanying text. Some relevant case law and many
states' statutes suggest that directors are allowed to consider broader constituencies. See
James J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director and Officer Liability
Limitation and Indemnification, 43 Bus. LAW. 1207, 1227-30 (1988) (discussing "non-
stockholder-constituency" statutes); R. Cammon Turner, Shareholders vs. the World,
Bus. LAW TODAY, Jan./Feb. 1999, 32-35. See also DENNIS BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS
JUDGEMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 330-39 (4th ed. 1993).
16. See Hanks, supra note 15, at 1227-30.
17. See Williams Remarks, supra note 6.
18. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 15, at 330.
19. See infra notes 108-17 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 24-92 and accompanying text.
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will then question whether a duty to a broader constituency exists in
the case of bank mergers.23
II. RESPONDING TO A BID FOR ACQUISITION
A board of directors that has received an offer for acquisition
has several options. The first is simply to accept the offer.24  A
second option is for the bank to "put itself in play." That is, the
board may decide to seek out other potential suitors in an attempt to
maximize purchase price, and thus, the return to shareholders.25 Once
a bank, or any corporation for that matter, has made this decision, it
usually cannot be reversed. 26  If a bidding auction between two or
more bidders erupts after the bank has been put in play, price becomes
the only factor that the board can legitimately consider.27 Once a bank
has become the subject of an auction or bidding war such that its sale
is imminent, the directorate's sole duty becomes securing the highest
possible price for the corporation. 2' Accepting an offer which is not
the highest available 29 or unfairly favoring one side over another
during negotiations can be grounds for a shareholder-initiated
lawsuit.
30
23. See infra notes 93-127 and accompanying text.
24. See generally Jeremy Bacon, The Role of Outside Directors in Major Acquisitions
or Sales, 180 CONFERENCE BOARD RESEARCH BULLETIN 8-14 (1985); Randall Morck et al,
Characteristics of Targets of Hostile and Friendly Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS:
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 101, 105-13 (Alan J. Auerbach ed. 1988) (describing
characteristics of organizations which tend to resist bids for acquisition); Rose, supra note
5.
25. See Cox, supra note 13, § 23.7. See generally Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (describing the bidding war between Pantry
Pride, Inc. and Fortsmann Little & Company for Revlon, Inc.).
26. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 176. See also BLOCK ET AL., supra note 15, at 267-69;
Cox, supra note 13, § 23.7.
27. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 15, at 266-69; Cox , supra note 13, § 23.7. See
also Turner, supra note 15, at 32-33.
28. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184; BLOCK ET AL., supra note 15, at 266-69. This is
known as the "Revlon rule" or "Revlon moment." See Cox, supra note 13, § 23.7. The
Revlon Rule applies in situations where a bidding war has erupted. See id. Once the sale
of the bank becomes inevitable (this is referred to as the "Revlon Moment"), the board of
directors assumes the role of auctioneer and is charged with securing the highest price
possible for the corporation. See id.
29. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985) (holding that directors
had improperly researched the question of what was a fair price for their corporation when
they had relied on only one 20 minute presentation by an interested party).
30. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1286-87 (Del.
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A third option the board of directors may consider is the
decision to reject the offer and remain independent for the short to
mid-term.3' If the decision to reject an overture is made, the bank will
typically adopt a "Don't Tread on Me" posture so that potential future
acquirers are apprised of the bank's commitment to independence.32
This response typically involves the implementation of "legal teeth" to
support and make more meaningful the decision to remain
independent.33  These "teeth" include any number of anti-takeover
measures that may be employed to discourage unsolicited overtures.
Common defense measures include "poison pills," 3 4  charter
defenses,35 "golden parachutes," 36  "white knight" strategies,37 as
1989) (allowing differing treatment of bidders, so long as directors are fair and have the
shareholder's best interests in mind).
31. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 15, at 233-63. See generally Colin Leinster,
Business Dynasties Face the Raiders, FORTUNE, Mar. 17, 1986, at 22, 22-27; Morck et
al., supra note 24, at 105-13.
32. See generally LEO HERZEL & RICHARD W. SHEPRO, BIDDERS AND TARGETS:
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN THE U.S. 76 (1990); Richard S. Ruback, An Overview of
Takeover Defense, in MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 49 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988);
William H. Steinbrink, Management's Response to the Takeover Attempt, 28 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 882 (1977-78).
33. See Cox, supra note 13, § 23.4 (describing responsive and preventive defensive
measures).
34. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 15, at 519-24; HERZEL & SHEPRO, supra note 32, at
76; EDWARD P. WELCH & ANDREW TUREZYN, FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL
CORPORATION LAw § 141.2.6 (1999). See generally JoY M. BRYAN, CORPORATE ANTI-
TAKEOVER DEFENSES: THE POISON PILL DEVICE (1995). "Poison Pill" is a common
nickname for stockholder rights plans. See Cox, supra note 13, § 23.6. Such plans are
designed to make stock prohibitively expensive to a potential unwanted purchaser. See id.
The use of proactive defenses (i.e., ones not designed to respond to a particular overture)
such as the "poison pill" was upheld in Moren v. Household International, Inc., 500 A.2d
1346 (Del. 1985).
35. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 15, at 603. One example of a built-in charter
defense is a provision for staggered terms and elections for directors. See, e.g., DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (1994) (authorizing staggered terms and the splitting of the
board of directors into three groups, each with different election dates). Another popular
measure involves restructuring shareholders' voting rights. See JOEL SELIGMAN,
CORPORATIONS 509 (1995). "Dual classes of common stock with insiders owning the
exclusive voting stock or stock with disproportionate voting rights is a most effective
defense." Id. See also Joel Seligman, Stock Exchange Rules Affecting Takeovers &
Control Transactions, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE
TAKEOVER 465 (John C. Coffee et al. eds., 1988).
36. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 15, at 637; Cox, supra note 13, § 9.18. Hefty
severance packages for upper management, or "golden parachutes" as they are known in
the parlance of takeover jargon, can be used to eat into cash reserves that an acquirer may
be counting on to finance the purchase. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 15, at 637; Cox,
supra note 13, § 9.18.
37. See Cox, supra note 13, § 23.4. "White knights" are welcomed, friendly suitors
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well as the many regulatory impediments to bank mergers. 18
Regardless of the option the board ultimately chooses, the
decision must be based on a sound and objective analysis of the
benefits and risks to the corporation. 39 The driving force behind this
analysis is the director's fiduciary duty to the corporation and to the
shareholders.4 °  Failure to make the decision based on the
corporation's and the shareholders' best interests will expose a director
to liability. 4' Because the duties of directors play a crucial role in
defining their options when faced with an unwanted overture, an
analysis of those duties follows.
who acquire a corporation before a raider can. See id. See generally Piper v. Chris-Craft
Indust., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (describing battle for Piper Aircraft Corp. between hostile
bidder Chris-Craft Indust., Inc. and Piper's "white knight," Bangor Punta Corp.);
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (in
which Revlon was the subject of a bidding war between hostile raider Pantry Pride and
"white knight" Forstmann Little & Company).
38. The primary regulatory impediment is found at 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(2) (1994).
The section states:
No insured depository institution shall merge or consolidate with any
other insured depository institution or, either directly or indirectly,
acquire the assets of, or assume liability to pay any deposits made in,
any other insured depository institution except with the prior written
approval of the responsible agency, which shall be-the Comptroller
of the Currency if the acquiring, assuming, or resulting bank is to be a
national bank or a District bank; the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System if the acquiring, assuming, or resulting bank
is to be a State member bank (except a District Bank); the Corporation
if the acquiring, assuming, or resulting bank is to be a State
nonmember insured bank (except a District bank or a savings bank
supervised by the Director of the office of Thrift Supervision); and the
Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision if the acquiring, assuming,
or resulting institution is to be a savings association.
Id.
39. See generally Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del.
1985) (holding that the board of directors has an obligation to determine whether the offer
is in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders).
40. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (stating that the analysis of the board's actions to
prevent a takeover begins with the basic principle that directors have a fiduciary duty to
act in the best interests of the corporation and its stockholders) (citing Guth v. Loft, Inc. 5
A.2d 503, 510 (1939)). See also infra notes 42-81 and accompanying text.
41. See Gilbert v. Bagley, 492 F.Supp. 714, 737 (M.D.N.C. 1980) (holding that
directors are not excused from shareholders' claims of breach of fiduciary duty).
372 [Vol. 3
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III. DUTIES OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
A. The Fiduciary Duty to Shareholders
The fiduciary duty of corporate directors springs from the
common law.42 Directors are held to standards established by state
law in civil cases.43 Most states have codified the common law duty
under the Corporations sections of their statutes.' The duty of
directors is thus both a statutory and a common law duty.45
The directors' duty is generally divided into two parts: the
duty of care46 and the duty of loyalty.47 These duties require a director
42. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del.
1986); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 890 (Del. 1985); Singer v. Magnavox Co.,
380 A.2d 969, 977 (Del. 1977); Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 2 A.2d 225, 238 (Del Ch. 1938),
af'd, 5 A.2d 503 (1939); Wilson v. McClenny, 262 N.C. 121, 136 S.E.2d 569 (1964).
43. See Atherton v. F.D.I.C., 117 S.Ct. 666, 674 (1997) (holding that any federal
common law addressing the standard of care owed by a bank's board of directors did not
survive Erie R.R.. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
44. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. §55-8-30 (1997).
45. See Sealy Mattress Co. of N.J. v. Sealy, Inc., 532 A.2d 1324, 1337 (Del. Ch.
1987).
46. See infra notes 43-89 and accompanying text. See also BLOCK ET AL., supra note
15, at 51-52; WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS
AND DIRECTORS § 1.04 (4th ed. 1988); SAMUEL C. THOMPSON, JR., BUSINESS PLANNING
FOR MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS § 2.2 (1997).
47. See infra notes 42-88 and accompanying text. See also BLOCK ET AL., supra note
15, at 51-52; KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 46, § 1.04; THOMPSON, supra note 46, §
2.2.
Some confusion exists over where the boundary between the duty of care and the duty of
loyalty lies. See Hanks, supra note 15, at 1212 (stating, "the Delaware Supreme Court
itself has had difficulty in distinguishing the duty of care from the duty of loyalty"). See
generally Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Min. Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del. 1987)
(discussing the difference between the duties of care and loyalty in the context of a lawsuit
by a hostile bidder to stop anti-takeover measures employed by a target corporation); AC
Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986)
(describing the court's process for examining the extent to which a business transaction
satisfies the duties of care and loyalty). A decision which satisfies the duty of care is
made when directors have "followed an appropriately deliberative process." Hanks,
supra note 15, at 1212. A decision conforms to the requirements of the duty of loyalty
when it is "made by directors with no financial interest in the transaction adverse to the
corporation." Id. See also, WELCH & TUREZYN, supra note 34, § 141.2.1.1. The duty
of loyalty requires that the director's duties be discharged in a manner believed to be in
the best interest of the corporation and its shareholders. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (citing Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503,
510 (1939)). The central theme of this duty is that a director is prohibited from competing
with the bank. See Cox, supra note 13, § 10.12. Directors are required to resolve the
conflict between duty and self-interest in favor of the bank. See id.
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to be diligent and honest in administering the bank's affairs; to place
the interests of the bank above her own; and to ensure that transactions
between the director and the bank take place on terms that are fair to
the bank.48  Though it seems obvious, directors may only authorize
bank activities that are legal.49
Directors are generally held to a gross negligence standard in
fulfilling their duties. 5° In Atherton v. FDIC,5' the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the Financial Institution Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA)52 sets a gross negligence standard
as the minimum standard of care for directors . 53 The FIRREA gross
negligence standard does not, however, "stand in the way of a stricter
standard that the laws of some States provide." 54 The standard of care
which directors of state and federally chartered banks owe is,
therefore, set by State law, 55 though it must be at least a gross
negligence standard.5 6 Although Atherton helped to clarify the standard
of care owed, some doubt remains as to whether the question has been
entirely settled. 57
Not all transactions between a director and the bank constitute a conflict of
interest; in fact, some might be advantageous to both parties. See ROBINSON, supra note
13, §14-4. Transactions between directors (some of whom may be among the bank's best
customers) and their banks do not automatically violate the duty of loyalty. See id.
Federal Reserve System Regulation 0 addresses this issue. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 215.4-215.5
(1998). Regulation 0 allows banks to extend credit to insiders only when certain
conditions are met. See id.
48. See Cox, supra note 13, § 10.12; KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 46, §§ 1.04-
1.06; ROBINSON, supra note 13, § 14-4.
49. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 15, at 41-43; Cox, supra note 13, § 10.8; KNEPPER
& BAILEY, supra note 46, § 1.04; ROBINSON, supra note 13, § 14-3(b). See also Miller v.
American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 507 F.2d 759, 762 (1974) (holding that the
business judgement rule cannot insulate directors from liability for criminal acts).
50. See, e.g., Atherton v. FDIC, 117 S.Ct. 666 (1997) (holding that a federal statute
addressing the standard of care owed by bank directors and officers does not preempt state
statutes, but rather establishes a ground floor standard for director negligence).
51. See id.
52. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (1994).
53. See Atherton, 117 S.Ct. at 674; Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del.
1985).
54. See Atherton, 117 S.Ct. at 674.
55. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-30(a)(2) (1990) (requiring directors to exercise
the care that "an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar
circumstances").
56. SeeAtherton, 117 S.Ct. at 674.
57. See Stacey Taylor Kern, Note, Atherton v. FDIC: The Final Word on Bank Officer
and Director Liability?, 2 N.C. BANKING INST. 149 (1998).
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The foundation case establishing the duties of a directorate
attempting to thwart an unwanted bid for acquisition is Unocal Corp.
v. Mesa Petroleum Co.58  Unocal was modified by Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.59  Unocal has also been
supplemented by the decision of the Delaware Supreme Court in
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings.60 These cases are
applicable in the general realm of corporate law, and thus to the more
narrow field of banking law.
Unocal laid out a two pronged analysis for assessing director
duties. 6' In the first prong, the court must determine whether there
was some basis to conclude that a valid corporate purpose was served
by the defensive measure taken.62 The board satisfies this step by
making a showing of "good faith and reasonable investigation." 63
Generally, the more significant the issue, the greater the level of care
that should be exercised in prosecuting an investigation. 4 The crux of
this duty, especially as it applies to a bid for acquisition or merger, is
that a director may not make decisions without an understanding of
what the particular ramifications of a decision will be and without
believing that those ramifications are in the best interest of the
corporation. 65  A director is required to investigate any reasonably
foreseeable answer to the issue at hand. 66 In the context of a bid for
acquisition, it has been held that a proper analysis or "reasonable
investigation" of an offer cannot take place absent consideration of the
price being offered.67
58. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
59. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
60. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
61. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985);
BLOCK ET AL., supra note 15, at 237; Cox, supra note 13, § 23.5.
62. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
63. Id. (quoting Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554-555 (1964)). See also Cox,
supra note 13, § 23.5.
64. See, e.g., In re Fort Howard Corp. Shareholders Litig., C.A. No. 9991 (Del. Ch.
1988) (explaining that a sale in which control of the corporation changes hands presents a
more significant issue than regular sales of stock to shareholders requiring more
information, because it is more likely to alter the corporation's profitability).
65. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
66. See UIS, Inc. v. Walbro Corp. et al., C.A. No. 9323, slip op. at 5-6 (Del. Ch.
1987).
67. See Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 257 (7th Cir.
1986) (holding that a proper analysis of an offer cannot take place without a consideration
of the offering price). But see Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985)
1999] 375
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The second prong of the Unocal analysis requires the court to
ask whether the defensive measure employed by the board was
reasonable, given the threat to the corporation.6 s Unocal, however,
left some doubt as to what exactly constitutes a reasonable measure
under the test. 69 This gray area has been greatly diminished by the
Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Paramount Communications,
Inc. v. Time, Inc.
70
Paramount addressed the question of what constitutes a
reasonable response to the threat posed by a bid for acquisition. 7' A
central holding of Paramount is that defensive anti-takeover measures
employed by a board are presumed to be reasonably tailored to the
threat posed, so long as they are not calculated to completely block
any and all bids for acquisition.72 Paramount, in effect, holds that the
second prong of the Unocal analysis is satisfied so long as the
defensive measures employed would not block every potential takeover
bid.73 This is a substantial qualification of the rule of Unocal. In the
final analysis, a board is really only required to satisfy the first prong
of Unocal.74
The rule in Unocal has been supplemented by another
important Delaware case, Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings.75 Revlon has been described as "a significant qualification
of Unocal. ,76  Revlon does not replace Unocal, but rather acts to
modify it under certain circumstances.77  When a corporation
(holding that a consideration of price alone is not necessarily enough).
68. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
69. See Cox, supra note 13, § 23.5. One interpretation held that the court is required
to examine every defensive measure employed by the target corporation and balance it
against the threat posed. See id. A more lax interpretation presumed that the board's
defensive measures were reasonable in relation to the threat posed, so long as there was a
showing of good faith and reasonable investigation in the first prong. See id.
70. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
71. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 15, at 267-68.
72. See Cox, supra note 13, § 23.7. The court in Paramount found that the threat
posed to Time's long-range plan and the potential for shareholder confusion was sufficient
to require the defensive response Time undertook. See id. This is significant because it
means there are factors other than inadequate offering price that pose a threat sufficient to
require a defensive measure. See id.
73. See Cox, supra note 13, § 23.7.
74. See id.
75. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
76. Cox, supra note 13, § 23.7.
77. See id. There are three scenarios under which Revlon might be applied: (1) When
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encounters these particular circumstances, it is sometimes described as
having entered the "Revlon Moment." 7' This occurs when the sale or
break-up of the corporation becomes imminent.7 9 Once a corporation
enters the "Revlon moment," the sole duty of the board is to maximize
the price received for the company.80 Since price becomes the only
factor that can be considered in choosing a buyer, the board of
directors is often described as adopting the role of auctioneer when in
this situation."s
B. The Business Judgment Rule
Directors are not always able to accurately predict what the
effects of a particular decision might be. The board is insulated from
liability resulting from "poor decisions," so long as it relied on a valid
business reason to support its decision regarding the particular
matter.8 ' This is known as the Business Judgment Rule. 3  The
Business Judgment Rule does not in any way alter or replace the duties
of the director; rather the rule qualifies these duties. 84
the target bank initiates an active bidding process designed to "put the company in play,"
with the company's sale becoming imminent; (2) When the target corporation abandons its
long-range plan and pursues a shorter-term plan to break up the company; or (3) The
target board adopts a plan designed to alter who is controlling the corporation. See id.
See also BLOCK ET AL., supra note 15, at 266-69.
78. See Cox, supra note 13, § 23.7.
79. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews and Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182-84
(Del. 1986); BLOCK ET AL., supra note 15, at 267-69; Cox, supra note 13, §23.7; Turner,
supra note 15, at 32-33.
80. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
81. See Cox, supra note 13, § 23.7.
82. Though it is by no means a black letter rule, courts generally apply a stricter
standard to business decisions that affect the ownership of the corporation than to
decisions affecting its operation. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 15, at 233; ROBINSON,
supra note 13, § 14-6 (1995). A board is technically insulated from liability for decisions
made during an acquisition, so long as there was a valid business reason for that decision.
See Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1984) (holding that board was insulated
from liability when it had thoroughly and objectively reviewed an acquisition).
83. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 15, at 3. In Delaware, the business judgment rule
has been codified at Title 8, Section 141(a) of the Deleware Code. In North Carolina, it
is a product of the common law. See ROBINSON, supra note 13, § 14-6. There are
multiple interpretations of the business judgment rule, including the Delaware Business
Judgment Rule, the American Legal Institute Business Judgment Rule, and the Model
Business Corporation Act Business Judgment Rule. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 15, at
43. See also R. Franklin Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr., Rejudging the Business Judgment
Rule, 48 Bus. LAw. 1337 (1993).
84. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 180 (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812
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A board will often not have the time or training to assess every
critical decision itself.s This is especially true when it is faced with a
bid for acquisition. In such situations, directors are entitled to rely on
the opinion of an expert who is more knowledgeable about a particular
area or problem. 6 This is known as the right of reliance. 7 This
right, unlike the bulk of the director's bundle of duties, is a statutory
creation rather than a product of the common law. 8
C. Application of the Directors' Duties
The primary way a board of directors observes its duty,
whatever the applicable standard of judicial review, is by maximizing
the value of the shareholders' investment.8 9 In order to reject a
particular overture, the board must make a determination, in good
faith and after exercising due care, that the benefits of the acquisition
are outweighed by its threat to current and future goals. 90  This'
analysis usually hinges on price.9'
The board of directors is, however, also likely to entertain
concerns other than price.92 One possible consideration that could
enter into the equation, especially for a community bank, is the duty to
the community in general. If such a duty is found to exist, the nature
of a board of directors' duties, and consequently the analysis required
for response to a bid for acquisition, could expand greatly.
(1984)). "While the business judgment rule may be applicable to the actions of corporate
directors responding to takeover threats, the principles upon which it is founded-care,
loyalty, and independence- must first be satisfied." Id.
85. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 15, at 96.
86. See id.
87. See id; ROBINSON, supra note 13, § 14-5.
88. See DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. 55-8-30(b) (1990).
89. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985).
90. See id.
91. See Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 257 (7th Cir.
1986).
92. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985) (stating that
consideration of price alone may not be enough).
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IV. DUTY TO A BROADER CONSTITUENCY
Any consideration of duties to a broader constituency would
have to take place before a company entered the "Revlon moment.",
93
Once the Revlon rule becomes applicable, all considerations except
price become moot.94 There is, however, some basis in both statutory
and case law, for the proposition that directors should take into
account a duty to the community when assessing a bid for acquisition
under the first prong of Unocal. The existence of a board of director's
duty to a broader constituency is implied in many state statutes.95 A
majority of the states have adopted statutes that allow directors to
consider non-stockholder constituencies when assessing bids for
acquisition. 96 No state statute, 97 however, explicitly defines a duty to
the community. Therefore, the duties owed to the bank's shareholders
(which are explicitly defined) seemingly must take priority. 9' Some
case law, including Unoca99 and Paramount,'00 contain indirect
references to a potential duty to a broader constituency, but they by no
93. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text. See also Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986); Turner, supra note 15,
at 32-33.
94. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
95. See Hanks, supra note 15, at 1227-30.
96. See A.A. Sommer, Jr., It All Comes Down to Money, Bus. LAW TODAY,
Jan./Feb. 1999, at 36, 36. A recent count found 30 states with broader constituency
statutes. See id. States with broader constituency provisions in their statutes include:
Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 15, at 333-34
(1993). Delaware is conspicuously absent from the list, as is North Carolina. See id.
Indiana's statute is typical of most. It states "[a] director may, in considering the best
interests of the corporation, consider the effects of any action on shareholders, employees,
suppliers, and customers of the corporation, and communities in which offices or other
facilities of the corporation are located and any other factors the director considers
pertinent." IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1(d) (1997).
97. Connecticut's statute is close to establishing an affirmative duty to consider a
deal's impact on a broader constituency. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-756(d)(4)
(West 1997) (stating that a director "shall consider" broader constituencies, including
"community and societal considerations including those of any community in which any
office or other facility of the corporation is located"). See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 15,
at 333.
98. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 15, at 333. See also Hanks, supra note 15, at
1207.
99. 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
100. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
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means require that community concerns be taken into account.01 The
court in Unocal stated:
A further aspect is the element of balance. If a
defensive measure is to come within the ambit of the
business judgement rule, it must be reasonable in
relation to the threat posed. This entails an analysis by
the directors of the nature of the takeover bid and its
effect on the corporate enterprise. Examples of such
concerns may include: inadequacy of the price offered,
nature and timing of the offer, questions of illegality,
the impact on "constituencies" other than shareholders
(i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps
even the community generally)....
The Court in Paramount also allowed Time's board of directors wide
latitude in weighing considerations other than price. 103
Aside from the implications of Unocal, Paramount, and state
statutes, there are three premises upon which a duty to the community
might be based. First, the corporate charter, which is akin to a
contract between the state, the corporation, and the directors, might
create a contractual duty to consider a broader constituency.'"'
Second, the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)0 5 requires and
evaluates community involvement.10 6 Third, a corporation may take
on a duty to the community through its long-term behavior as an
organization. Over a period of years or decades, community service
and involvement could become an element of the bank's corporate
culture.0 7
101. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del.
1990); Mills Acquisition Co. v. McMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1282 n.29 (Del. 1988);
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). See also BLOCK
ET AL., supra note 15, at 330-31.
102. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
103. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text. Time was allowed to consider the
potential effect the acquisition might have had on its corporate culture. See also
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
104. See infra notes 108-17 and accompanying text.
105. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2907 (1994).
106. See infra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
107. See infra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
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A. Corporate Charter and Bylaws as a Contract
The corporate charter and bylaws of a bank are basically a
contract between the state, the corporation, and the shareholders of the
bank.08 Charters or bylaws are sometimes drafted to contain a
provision making a commitment, on the bank's behalf, to community
service and involvement.' 09 Such provisions in a charter are generally
upheld, unless they run contrary to public policy. 1 0 Provisions of this
type are clearly favorable from a public policy standpoint because they
are designed to benefit the broader community.
Balancing problems may arise if the director's duty under the
charter is at odds with the duty to the shareholders.' Delaware
courts have held that the duties owed to the shareholders must override
any other duties or obligations, including the directors' fiduciary duty
to the corporation. 1 2 However, there has been a recent trend favoring
108. See Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F.Supp 369, 373 (D. Del.
1965).
109. See CENTRAL CAROLINA BANK, Corporate Bylaws. The bylaws of Central
Carolina Bank (CCB) contain such a provision. Article XII of CCB's bylaws reads:
Additional Constituents:
In connection with the exercise of its or their judgement in determining
what is in the best interests of the Corporation and its shareholders, the
Board of directors of the Corporation, any committee of the Board of
Directors, or any individual director may, but shall not be required to,
in addition to considering the long-term and short-term interests of the
shareholders, consider any of the following factors and any other
factors which it or they deem relevant: (i) the social and economic
effects of the matter to be considered on the Corporation and its
subsidiaries, its and their employees, depositors, customers, and
creditors, and the communities in which the Corporation and its
subsidiaries operate or are located....
CENTRAL CAROLINA BANK, Corporate Bylaws, Article XII. Such a provision clearly
broadens the spectrum of considerations a board of directors may weigh when considering
a bid for acquisition. See also Hanks, supra note 15, at 1227-1230.
110. See Frankel v. Donovan, 120 A.2d 311, 316-17 (Del. Ch. 1956).
111. See Hanks, supra note 15, at 1228-29. The author stated that
[t]he difficulty with these statutes is that they raise and resolve,
apparently with very little legislative discussion, one of the most
fundamental issues of corporate law: To whom do the directors owe
their duties?... From a simple practical standpoint, as any director of
a major corporation knows, it is difficult enough to determine the best
interests of the corporation and its stockholders; it would be even more
difficult to determine the interests of other constituencies, much less
balance the often competing claims of these groups.
Id.
112. See Halifax Fund, L.P. v. Response USA, Inc., C.A. No. 15553 (Del. Ch.
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a balancing of contractual rights with Revlon auction duties.1 3  A
recent Delaware case, The Kontrabecki Group, Inc. v. Triad Park,
LLC,"4 enforced a contract which seemingly was at odds with the
directors' "Revlon" duties. While this sort of contract is different
from the idea that a corporate certificate or bylaws is a contract, the
emergence of a trend away from blind allegiance to Revlon's duty to
shareholders seems to be emerging." 5
In some cases, no conflict may exist between obligations to
shareholders and to the provisions of the charter. Shareholders who
have made an informed decision to invest in the bank in the first place
have, in a way, ratified the charter and are probably unlikely to
disagree with its provisions. " 6 If the charter provision was disclosed
to the shareholder before the investment in the bank was made, the
shareholder's buying of shares could be construed as ratification. "'
Thus, the contractual nature of the corporate charter might go beyond
mere support of an obligation to weigh community concerns, to the
actual establishment of a duty.
1997). Halifax held that "there is no fiduciary duty that excuses management causing the
corporation to breach its fundamental contractual obligations to its investors." Id. The
opinion, however, goes on to state that there are Delaware cases in which directors have
been permitted to act in the best interests of the corporation and all shareholders generally,
though the action may not be in the best interests of some shareholders. See id.
113. See Gregory V. Varallo & Rod J. Howard, Protecting the Deal in an Auction,
Bus. LAW TODAY, Jan./Feb. 1999, at 42, 42-46.
114. C.A. No. 16256 (Del. Ch. Mar. 17, 1998).
115. See Varallo & Howard, supra note 113, at 42-46. "At the very least, it now
appears as though the court will no longer gloss over such arguments, assuming that, in all
cases, the interests of the stockholders must necessarily prevail over the interest of
contract parties." Id at 46.
116. See Frankel v. Donovan, 120 A.2d 311, 316-17 (Del.Ch. 1956).
117. Uwharrie Capital Corporation's Bank of Stanly, located in Albemarle, NC, is an
example of an institution which seems to have adopted this stance. See UWHARRIE
CAPITAL CORP., 1997 Annual Report (1998). The 1997 Annual Report of Uwharrie
Capital Corporation includes a list of "Core Values" which states, among other things,
that the corporation "will never put profits before the welfare of people;" that activities
"will contribute to the literacy and/or economic benefit of our community;" and that
success will be measured by "meeting the needs of all of our stakeholders: customers,
associates, shareholders, community, region." Id. at 5.
Similarly, the prospectus for the corporation's 1998-1999 offering of common
stock states, "[tl he Company is community oriented, emphasizing the well-being of the
people in its region above financial gain in directing its corporate decisions." UWHARRIE
CAPITAL CORP., Common Stock Offering Prospectus, 2 (1998). These documents are on
public record, and thus, it can be argued that shareholders understand and ratify the
policies of the bank.
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B. The Community Reinvestment Act
In the foregoing respect, bank charters may set standards of
director conduct similar to those imposed by the first section of the
Community Reinvestment Act." 8 The first section of the CRA states,
"regulated financial institutions are required by law to demonstrate
that their deposit facilities serve the convenience and needs of the
communities in which they are chartered to do business." "9 The
statute lays down a hard and fast requirement, and just as bank
directors should ensure that their own institutions meet the
requirement, so too should an acquiring firm's ability to meet this
requirement be assessed. This would probably take place under the
Unocal analysis.
This argument is buoyed by the fact that an acquirer's poor
CRA rating could stymie future growth by hindering agency
approval. 2 The CRA rating is significant since a poor rating can
delay agency approval of future applications for acquisitions or
mergers.' Sections 2903 and 2906(b)(2) of the CRA make provisions
for a rating system 22 to evaluate a bank's commitment to the
community. The CRA rating could be an important consideration for
directors, especially those directors whose banks currently have high
ratings and strong community involvement, because the rating could
indicate how much a bank's corporate identity as a "community
partner" might change as the result of a particular acquisition.
118. 12 U.S.C. § 2901-2907 (1994).
119. 12 U.S.C. § 2901(a)(1) (emphasis added).
120. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 2902(a)(3), 2903(a)(2). CRA ratings are reviewed prior to the
granting of approval for future mergers or other agency permits. See id. §§ 2902(a)(3),
2903(a)(2). Poor ratings can hinder agency approval. See id. §§ 2902(a)(3), 2903(a)(2).
121. See Community Reinvestment Act: A Citizen's Guide to the CRA, Banking Circular
(OCC> No. 261, at *6 (Sept. 22, 1992), available in LEXIS, Bankng Library, ALLOCC
File.
122. The system establishes four classifications: (1) Outstanding, (2) Satisfactory, (3)
Needs Improvement, and (4) Substantial Noncompliance. See 12 U.S.C. § 2906(b)(2).
123. The CRA was enacted in part to address the practice of redlining. See 12 U.S.C.
§§ 2901-2907. While redlining is directed at specific neighborhoods, a community bank
could have concerns that a potential acquirer might redline the bank's community, a
concern reiterated in a recent address given by the Acting Comptroller of the Currency.
See Williams Remarks, supra note 6.
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C. Implicit Acceptance of a Community Duty
Another way in which the duty to a broader constituency might
be supported is through the notion of community reliance. Many
small and medium sized community banks have established strong ties
with their communities over a period of years or decades. 124 Banks
support the local business community through their lending, and some
even serve almost as an informal chamber of commerce. 125 They may
make donations to support schools and other institutions that enrich the
entire community. 2 6  After a period, a community may very well
come to expect that such support will be lent, and the bank's
shareholders and directors may accept that such support is part of the
bank's corporate identity. Long-term community involvement of this
nature could result in the community's reliance on the bank's
continuing commitment.
Long-term commitment to community could also be embraced
as part of the bank's corporate identity. In Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., the court held that incompatible
corporate cultures, between acquirer and target, constitutes a valid
objection to a proposed merger. 121 Thus, a target bank could argue
that an acquirer's lack of desire to be heavily involved in that
particular community would be a threat to its corporate culture. This
threat could be very real, as acquirers often look to move into
geographic regions precisely because they have historically lacked
strong connections with the particular geographic market. This third
foundation of the duty to a broader constituency would take time to
develop, whereas the first two would not. It would, in all likelihood
be applicable only to banks that have become closely associated with a
specific area over a long period of time.
124. Returning to the previous example of the Uwharrie Capital Corporation, the Bank
of Stanly has involved itself heavily in its community. See UWHARRIE CAPITAL CORP.,
11, 1997 Annual Report (1998). The corporation's annual report lists numerous
community programs and organizations it supports, including: county schools, fire
departments, law enforcement, Habitat for Humanity, hospitals, and the County Historic
Preservation Society. See id. It could be argued that over a period of years, this sort of
involvement becomes a part of the corporate identity and something which citizens of the
community come to rely on.
125. See UWHARRIE CAPITAL CORP., 1997 Annual Report (1998).
126. See id.
127. 571 A.2d 1140, 1153-54 (Del. 1990).
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V. CONCLUSION
A board of directors must bear in mind its duty as a fiduciary
when responding to an unwanted overture. 12 8  The duty of care
requires that directors make the choice to reject an offer and remain
independent only if that decision will benefit the interests of the
corporation and shareholders. 
129
Additionally, other considerations may influence the board's
decision. One such consideration is the possible existence of a duty to
a broader constituency, such as the community. 3 ° The Delaware
Supreme Court's decisions in Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum13 ' and
132Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., as well as
statutes 33 enacted in several states, give directors latitude to weigh
considerations broader than the scope of shareholder interests,
including community interests. While these cases and statutes
probably do not indicate the existence of an affirmative duty, there are
other theories that might support an affirmative duty. 13' The duty to
weigh community concerns may be premised on provisions in the
corporate charter, 135 on the Community Reinvestment Act, 136 or simply
on a bank's tradition of community involvement and corporate
128. See supra notes 42-88 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 93-127 and accompanying text.
131. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). See supra notes 58-74 and accompanying text.
132. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990). See supra notes 58-74 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 104-27 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 108-18 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
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identity. 137 If one or more of these "sources of duty" are found to
create an affirmative duty to the community, the result could be a
major change in the duties of a board of directors faced with a bid for
acquisition.
TODD HAMMOND EVESON*
137. See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
The author is indebted to Anthony Gaeta, Jr., of Moore & Van Allen, Raleigh, NC, who
graciously shared his ideas and expertise.
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